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Capital Account Liberalization:
Experience from the Emerging Market Economies
Mike I. Obadan *

I.

Introduction

T

he liberalization of the capital account of the balance of payments is
rooted in economic theory. Not only can it help to bridge savings and
foreign exchange gaps in national economies, and hence promote
higher economic growth, it can also lead to greater efficient allocation of
resources internationally and greater portfolio risk diversification, among
others (Obadan, 2005). Perhaps, in the light of this, and against the background
of developed financial markets, the industrial countries set the pace in capital
account liberalization in the 1970s following the collapse of the Bretton Woods
fixed exchange rate system. The liberalization was further accelerated in the
1980s. But, perhaps, because of underdeveloped domestic financial markets
and less favourable environments, many developing countries commenced
moves from the mid-1980s to liberalize their capital accounts with promptings
from the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the IMF, and the World Bank.
Indeed, it was not until the 1990s, in the context of various structural
adjustment programmes inspired by the Bretton Wood institutions that many
developing countries stepped up capital account liberalization (CAL).
Actually, the IMF initiated moves in the mid 1990s to amend its articles to
incorporate capital account convertibility/ liberalization as part of its mandate.
But then, until, perhaps, recently the downside of capital account liberalization
had not been adequately acknowledged. And a good number of the developing
countries went through financial liberalization without taking precautionary
measures or meeting the pre-conditions in order to minimize risks and obtain
desirable outcomes. With the crises and associated problems that have tended
* Obadan is a Professor of Economics, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. The views expressed
herein do not represent the views of the institution to which he is affiliated. The author acknowledges the
comments and suggestions ofanonymous reviewers.
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to accompany CAL, the opening of capital account has been a subject of
intense debate with an emerging consensus on the need to manage the risks
posed by rapid and large flows of short-term capital in a very liberalized
environment.
In the light of the foregoing, this paper explores the experiences of the
developing countries, in particular, the emerging market economies, in capital
account liberalization. To this end, the paper is divided into five sections. To
provide the necessary background, section 2 which follows, reviews and
clarifies some issues. This is followed by section 3 which overviews capital
account liberalization in developing / emerging market economies. Section 4
discusses some individual countries' experiences at liberalization. The last
section concludes the paper by drawing attention to some lessons and preconditions for orderly and successful liberalization outcomes.
II.

Conceptual Clarification

Emerging Market Economy
Antoine W. van Agtmael of the World Bank Group, in 1981, defined an
emerging, or developing market economy (EME) as an economy with low-tomiddle per capita income (Heakel, 2003). In practice, relatively big and small
economies have fallen into the emerging market categorization because of
their developments and reforms. EMEs are considered to be fast growing
economies and characterized as transitional. The latter means that they are in
the process of moving from a closed to an open market economy while
building accountability within the system. The economic reform programme
embarked upon by an EME is expected to lead it to stronger and more
responsible economic performance levels, as well as engender transparency
and efficiency in the capital market. Apart from implementing reforms, an
EME is most likely receiving aid and guidance from larger donor countries
and/or international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.
Besides, an EME tends to experience an increase in both local and foreign
investment. Emerging market investments entail bigger risks and bigger
rewards, thus providing an opportunity for investors to diversify while adding
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risk. Among the notable EMEs are China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Egypt, Israel, South Africa,
Turkey, Hungary, Poland and Russia.

Concept of Capital Account Liberalization
The capital account is the second broad component ofthe balance of payments.
It records both the borrowing and lending of the residents of a country. Thus,
items in the account are essentially transactions in financial assets which
directly affect wealth and debt and hence national income in future periods.
Capital account liberalization (CAL) refers to freedom from prohibitions on
transactions on the capital and financial accounts of the balance of payments
(Eichengreen and Mussa, 1998). It entails lifting restrictions on foreign capital
inflows and outflows. According to Stiglitz (2003: 65), capital account
liberalization has also meant eliminating the rules and regulations in
developing countries that could stem the flows of speculative and volatile hot
money - short-term loans and contracts that are usually no more than bets on
exchange rate movements - into and out of countries. Correspondingly, a
liberalized or open capital market is one in which individuals and firms can
access international financial markets freely.
An open capital account implies capital account convertibility which refers to
the freedom to convert local financial assets into foreign financial assets, and
vice versa, at market determined exchange rates. In other words, it means the
removal of foreign exchange controls. It is associated with changes of
ownership in foreign/domestic financial assets and liabilities and embodies the
creation and liquidation of claims on, or by the rest of the world (Schneider,
2000: 6). However, capital account convertibility does not necessarily imply
removal of tax-like instruments imposed on the underlying transactions which
need not be viewed as incompatible with the desired goal of capital account
liberalisation (Eichengreen, 1998). An open capital account also implies
currency convertibility. A country is said to have achieved full currency
convertibility of its currency when residents and non-residents are allowed to
convert the local currency, at prevailing exchange rates, into foreign currencies
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and to use the latter freely for international transactions (Nsouli and Rached,
1998; Obadan, 2005: 5).
Strategies for Opening the Capital Account

There have been debates among economists on the approaches to capital
account liberalization in terms of the pace and sequencing of liberalization. In
this direction, two broad approaches stand out, namely, the 'big bang' approach
and the gradualist approach. The gradualist approach entails a more deliberate
and phased strategy to economic reform that emphasizes reforms in the capital
account. Under this approach, the phasing of liberalization may be based on
distinctions between residents and non-residents as was done in India and
South Africa. India liberalized current transactions and related controls on
non-residents and effected some relaxations on FDI by corporates. Similarly,
South Africa followed the sequence of abolishing controls on current
transactions; abolition of exchange controls on non-resident investment by
domestic corporates, etc. The gradualist approach also entails the
liberalization of inflows before outflows. In the liberalization process, uses
were made of both prudential limits in the form of quantity controls and price
controls. The management of the open capital account by the use of price
instruments and prudential limits was for the purpose of transforming the
maturity structure of capital flows and insulating the impact of large and
volatile flows on monetary and exchange rate policy. The experiences of Chile,
Colombia and Malaysia are illustrative of this approach. In general, the
gradualist approach takes cognizance of the need to prevent instabilities
generated by financial liberalization before adequate institutional safeguards
are put in place and hence stresses the wisdom in moving reforms in the real
sector, improved financial regulation and current account liberalization before
finally liberalizing the capital account.
The 'big bang' approach entails a more rapid transition to open capital account,
in some cases involving a one-step process in simultaneously liberalizing
controls on capital inflows and outflows. The argument is that since resources
are lost through obstacles to free capital flows (as with any protectionist
policy), the sooner it is liberalized the better. A number of countries have
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moved to open capital accounts in a one-step process. Among them are Hong
Kong, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Kyrgyz Republic, Mauritius, Uganda, Singapore,
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela.
On the question of whether or not it is sensible to liberalize gradually or adopt a
big bang approach, a consensus seems to have emerged. According to the
report of a conference on "Capital account liberalization: A Developing
Country Perspective", 2000, "given the potential benefits and costs of capital
account liberalization and the fact that the poorly developed institutional
structure (primarily in the financial system) of developing countries heightens
the risk of crisis, the balance of evidence suggests that countries should adopt a
gradual movement towards CAL within a broad reform effort".
Capital Account Liberalization and Crisis

The classic case for international capital account liberalization is that flows
from capital abundant to capital-scarce countries raise welfare in the sending
and receiving countries alike on the assumption that the marginal product of
capital is higher in the latter than the former. Indeed, in autarky, the rate of
return in the domestic market is assumed to exceed the rate in the rest of the
world. And once the capital account is opened up, this differential generates a
capital inflow and a larger capital stock in the home country. In the final
equilibrium, GDP is higher because of the large capital stock. Domestic
labourers gain at the expense ofboth domestic and foreign owners of capital, so
also GNP is higher (Hanson, 1992: 2). Thus, CAL achieves an efficient
allocation of world savings as capital scarce countries (with a correspondingly
high marginal product of capital) can borrow from the rest of the world. The
capital movements from rich to poor countries accelerate domestic
accumulation and convergence (Gourinchas and Jeane, 2002: 5). Besides,
CAL, it is argued, does not result only in enhanced growth and efficiency, but
also creates opportunities for risk sharing and portfolio diversification,
intertemporal consumption smoothing and trade, technology transfer and
spillovers, among others (Eichengreen, et al, 1998: 12; Obadan, 2005).
However, the advertised benefits of capital account liberalization are
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dependent on certain pre-conditions and accompanying factors, in the absence
of which the elimination of controls on capital account may lead to
macroeconomic instability and unstable financial markets. Indeed, in a
significant number of countries, both domestic financial and external account
liberalization have been associated with costly financial crises. As
Eichengreen and Mussa ( 1998) have argued, although this association may
somehow be deceptive, given that financial crises are complex events with
multiple causes, there have been enough cases where financial liberalization,
including CAL, has played a significant role in crises. International capital
flows which result from capital account liberalization have tended to
precipitate a crisis where capital flows out of a country suddenly. Although
financial problems can result from the mismanagement of virtually any
financial transaction, short term capital has tended to pose special problems for
the maintenance of financial stability. In recent years, a large proportion of the
increased international financial flows consist of liquid short-term capital
attracted by arbitrage margins and prospects of speculative capital gain, rather
than by long-term yields on productive investment. They are extremely
volatile and subject to bandwagon effects, capable of generating gyrations in
security prices, exchange rates, and trade balances. They make little
contribution to the international allocation of savings or diffusion of
technology and hence to a reduction in international disparities in per capita
income(UNCTAD, 1997:94).
Capital account liberalization heightens the risk of crisis and amplifies the
effects of policy distortions through a number of channels. First, is the inflow
and outflow of short-term liquid and speculative capital as described above.
Second, by allowing the entry of foreign banks, CAL, like domestic financial
liberalization, can squeeze margins and remove domestic banks' cushion
against loan losses. Third, like domestic financial liberalisation, it can
facilitate gambling for redemption, in this case by offering access to elastically
1
supplied offshore funding and by allowing access to risky foreign investrnent •
Fourth, a currency crisis or unexpected devaluation can undermine the
1

Gambling for redemption refers to the pursuit of high-return but low probability investments by
institutions with low or negative net worth
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solvency of banks and bank customers who have been allowed to accumulate
large un-hedged foreign exposures by open capital accounts and lax
regulations. Crisis can also be triggered by such factors as herd behaviour and
bandwagon effects and contagion. Through the above channels, asymmetric
information and policy distortions can give rise to crises with special force
when the financial system has been liberalized.
A number of crisis episodes have occurred in the last two and half decades, the
most notable ones being the Southern cone currency and banking crises of the
early 1980s, the 1992 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis in Western
Europe, the Mexican crisis and its spill-over effects in 1994 -95; and the East
Asian currency and financial crises in 1997/98. In a number of cases, the crises
occurred in the context of newly liberalized capital accounts. The
susceptibility to financial crises has been heightened in those developing
countries that went through the process of financial liberalization without
taking precautionary measures or adhering to guidelines to minimize the risks.
The financial crises that hit some developing countries, especially in Asia and
Latin America, in the 1990s, with resultant huge economic costs, point to the
negative effects of volatile short-term capital flows and the grave risks and
dangers that accompany careless financial liberalization.

III.

Overview of Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Market
Economies

Substantial differences exist among the developing countries in terms of
experiences with capital account liberalization. Regional differences also exist
in the pattern of liberalization although CAL accelerated in all the regions in
the 1990s. In general, those countries that liberalized before 1980, started from
a strong balance of payments position (for example, Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore). But more recently, developing countries have undertaken capital
account liberalization under less favourable external conditions even in the
presence of external arrears (Eichengreen, et al, 1998). The regional patterns
reveal that Latin American countries were relatively open during the l 960s.
But the 1970s witnessed some increase in the number of Latin American
countries maintaining capital account restrictions. The prevalence of controls
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increased in the early and mid 1980s, as highly indebted countries imposed
restrictions on capital outflows in the wake of the external debt crisis.
However, capital account liberalization resumed in the late 1980s and early
1990s.
A different pattern occurred in Asia reflecting a steady decline in the number of
countries imposing capital account restrictions since the late 1970s. As the debt
crisis affected East Asia less than Latin America, there was no increase around
the time of the debt crisis. Capital account liberalization accelerated in the
1990s. In the Middle Eastern and European developing countries, no clear
liberalization trend was visible until the early 1990s. The same observation
applies to African countries where restrictions on capital account transactions
were applied in virtually every country during the 1970s and 1980s. In the
transition economies, capital account liberalization has proceeded speedily
since 1990.
The experiences of emerging market economies in CAL can be examined from
various angles such as sequencing and speed of liberalization, roles of
monetary and exchange rate regimes, prudential supervision, developments
following liberalization, etc.
Sequencing

In the context of the two broad approaches ('big bang' and 'gradualist'
approaches) discussed earlier, the emerging markets embody a variety of
experiences with respect to the sequencing of liberalization. A number of
countries initiated 'big bang' liberalizations of the capital account, freeing all
external transactions in a short time or rather abruptly. Among these countries
are Argentina, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
Kenya, Venezuela, Honk Kong S. A. R, Singapore, Mauritius, etc. For
example, Argentina, Peru and Kenya liberalized current and capital accounts
simultaneously. Many other countries sequenced CAL before moving, at
different paces, to liberalize the capital account. Thus, capital account
liberalization in a number of developing countries has occurred gradually. It
has been part of an overall approach to economic and structural reform and has
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occurred after the establishment of current account convertibility. Chile, for
example, liberalized current account transaction in 1977 and moved gradually
to liberalize the capital account over the 1985 -94 period. In the same way
India, after accepting the IMF's Article VIII obligations in 1994, moved
cautiously in liberalizing the capital account, allowing convertibility only for
non-residents. Indonesia and Korea both accepted Article VIII obligations in
1988 and pursued increased capital account liberalization in the early 1990s.
Even then many restrictions still remained.
Monetary and Exchange Regimes

Considering that in an economy with an open capital accounts the influence of
international variables is transmitted more quickly than in an economy with a
relatively closed capital account, it is important for an open capital account
management to have an exchange rate policy that is flexible, with market
participants bearing the exchange rate risk instead of the balance sheet of a
central bank (Schneider, 2000: 28). However, in the developing world, CAL
has been accompanied by a "polarization" in the choice of exchange rate
regime, with countries responding to the environment of increased capital
flows by either adopting hard currency pegs or moving toward greater nominal
exchange rate flexibility. In other words, approaches to the choice of exchange
rate regime have tended to be mixed. A fixed exchange rate regime backed by a
currency board was adopted by Argentina, Estonia, and Lithuania, providing a
strong institutional commitment to exchange rate stability and low inflation.
Some developing countries instead opted for a more flexible exchange rate
along with full convertibility, e.g., El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela. Others such
as Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago abandoned their formal pegs altogether.
Yet, other countries, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, adopted managed
floating regimes, with a view to ensuring the competitiveness of export
industries.
Financial Sector Reform

Opening the capital account exposes the domestic financial system to foreign
competition. In the light of this, most developing countries have attempted to
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implement financial sector reforms either prior to, or in conjunction with
liberalizing the capital account or soon after the capital account reform. These
reforms typically include freeing interest rates on loans and deposits,
developing indirect monetary instruments such as treasuring bills, and
abolishing credit ceilings. Freedom from controls on capital movements
heightens the role of domestic interest rates in avoiding destabilizing capital
flows. Competitive domestic financial markets would ensure the achievement
of market-based interest rates. Real interest rates were positive in most, but not
all cases at the time that full convertibility was adopted. In some other
countries, reform of the financial sector took place together with broader
reforms that included capital account liberalization. For example, in the Baltic
countries where a financial infrastructure did not exist, reforms had to be
undertaken on all fronts simultaneously.
Prudential Supervision

Opening the capital account could increase the risks for banks, through the
impact of increased volumes of capital flows on the deposit base and through a
possible increase in exchange rate volatility on banks' open foreign currency
positions. Capital account liberalization therefore requires strengthened
supervision related to foreign exchange risks, generally undertaken as part of
on-going, broad financial sector reforms. But then the area of prudential norms
and effective regulation is one that is gravely deficient in many developing
countries. Perversely, CAL in several countries has made the situation worse
since it has led states to retreat from effective regulatory oversight. However,
the experiences show that in many countries, reforms to strengthen prudential
supervision and improve standards were under way prior to and during
liberalization while in some others (e.g., Indonesia, Peru, Costa Rica) the
reforms took place mainly during and after adoption of capital account
convertibility. Prudential reforms have focused on improvements in the
supervisory framework, especially adopting new regulations and reporting
requirements, and increasing the ability of the supervisory authority to enforce
regulations. Nevertheless, according to Eichengreen, et al (1998: 38), preexisting weaknesses in banks' balance sheets and insufficient implementation
or enforcement of prudential regulations led to the emergence of severe
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banking problems in a number of countries that rapidly liberalized their capital
accounts, such as Costa Rica, Latvia, and Venezuela. Also, the Mexican
financial crisis of 1994-95, occurred against the background of inadequate
financial supervision and regulation by the monetary authorities.
Consequently, the banking system witnessed a rapid growth of credit to the
private sector in the face of weak human resource capacity while imprudent
lending practices were very conspicuous as easy access to external resources
made it possible to incur debt in foreign currencies without a proper evaluation
of exchange risk (Obadan, 2004). Besides, in the East Asian banking and
currency crises of 1997-98, financial sector weakness and misdirected
investment were major factors. These problems were exacerbated by the rapid
liberalization of financial markets without a commensurate strengthening of
supervision and regulation.
Post-Liberalization Developments

In the aftermath of capital account liberalization, some notable developments
have occurred in emerging market economies in the areas of current account
and balance of payments, inflows and outflows of capital, official foreign
exchange reserves, inflation, capital controls and financial crises, among
others. In general, the elimination of controls on capital account transactions
led to an increase in capital inflows, with an accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves and some worsening of the current account position. Official external
reserve holdings grew in most countries. Besides, many countries that had
accumulated substantial external payments arrears were able to reduce or
eliminate them altogether through cash payments or rescheduling and, more
importantly, to avoid accumulating new arrears. While current account deficits
increased in some countries, for example, Argentina, Estonia, Peru and
Singapore, they decreased in others, e.g, El Salvador, Jamaica and Malaysia.
But then, to a certain extent, a larger current account deficit would be expected
as credible reforms lead to larger capital inflows. It is also not surprising that
international reserves tended to increase following capital inflows.

Furthermore, in a number of Latin American countries Argentina, Mexico, El
Salvador, Costal Rica, etc the overall balance of payments positions improved
significantly although in some cases they deteriorated in later years.
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As a result of financial liberalization, private capital flows to developing
countries, particularly emerging market economies, increased in the 1990s.
Net private capital flows to the developing countries expanded substantially
rising from $44 billion in 1990 to $158.8 billion in 1994 and $299.0 billion in
1997. Tables 1 and 2 have the net capital account and financial account
positions of some EMEs. But then, private capital inflows were highly
concentrated in a small number of emerging economies. During 1990-97,
some 12 countries accounted for 77.0 per cent of total private flows to
developing countries. The most important recipients were China, Brazil,
Mexico, Korea, Argentina and Malaysia. The East Asian emerging market
economies that experienced crises in 1997-98 attracted huge capital inflows.
For example, between 1994 and 1996 net private capital inflows as a share of
GDP increased considerably, for example, by 7.0 per cent in Malaysia, 6.0 per
cent in Indonesia, and 5.0 per cent in the Philippines (Obadan, 2004: 219).
Also, Mexico, before its financial crisis in the 1990s, attracted unprecedented
amounts of capital into the country, reaching $104 billion between 1990 and
1994. The volume of net capital inflows into Mexico accounted for 11.6 per
cent of the total net inflows into developing countries in the 1990-95 period.
Capital account liberalization, coupled with years of structural adjustment and
macroeconomic stabilization, created a favourable economic outlook and the
possibility of better returns to foreign capital. Generally, the increased foreign
capital flows to emerging market economies have been due to factors such as
liberalization of financial transactions, deregulation of financial markets, and
accompanying high interest rates in relation to relatively low rates in the
mature markets. Also important was the removal of controls on international
capital movements and liberalization oftrade and exchange controls.
In some cases, however, deficiencies in financial sector reforms (particularly
in the areas of supervision and intervention) and poor macroeconomic policies
and conditions have created problems. Indeed, some of the major recipients of
the huge capital inflows have experienced sharp reversals causing a deep
economic and financial crisis, which affected not only the region but also
global financial markets. In both Mexico and East Asia, short-term
destabilizing capital flows played notable role in their financial crises. More
importantly, weak financial systems and misdirected investment/imprudent
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lending practices featured prominently in the crisis. In Mexico, against the
background of inadequate financial supervision and regulation by the
monetary authorities, the banking system witnessed a rapid growth of credit to
the private sector, reflecting imprudent lending practices. On the other hand, in
East Asia, distorted incentives, inadequate disclosure and supervision, lax
regulatory standards, poorly managed financial liberalization, and inadequate
disclosure and supervision resulted in weak financial sectors and corporate
governance all contributing to the banking and currency crises experienced in
the 1990s.
Thus, while large capital inflows alleviate liquidity constraints for the recipient
country, and foreign direct investment can contribute to increasing
productivity through direct and spillover effects, the inflows have tended to
pose problems for macroeconomic management, and sometimes led to crisis.
Consequently, a number of developing countries have adopted controls on
foreign capital. Controls on capital outflows have tended to be imposed or
strengthened during periods of economic distress, particularly in countries
facing severe capital flight. On the other hand, controls on inflows have been
associated with periods of economic boom, typically when confidence rises
following macroeconomic stabilization and reform (Eichengreen, et al, 1998:
38). Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela reintroduced controls on capital
transactions in the early stages of the 1980s debt crisis, as capital outflows
mounted. Also, some countries that have experienced destabilizing surges of
capital inflows have resorted to exchange controls or related incentives to cope
with them. Among these countries are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Korea,
Malaysia, and Mexico.
However, there has been no consensus in the literature on the effectiveness of
controls. Studies of the effectiveness of capital controls have tended to suffer,
to some extent, from a lack of agreement on what constitutes effectiveness.
Nevertheless, capital controls have been found to be effective considering the
experiences of Chile, Colombia, Malaysia and even Thailand (Obadan, 2005:
66). Chile and Colombia explicitly used controls to enable them to
simultaneously pursue internal and external balance in the context of large
capital inflows. Malaysia ( 1994) and Thailand (1995-96) implemented capital
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controls to limit inflows and regain a degree of control over monetary
aggregates. Again, in 1998, Malaysia introduced control measures to eliminate
offshore market for the local currency, provide a degree of monetary
independence and insulate the economy from further adverse developments in
international financial markets. Malaysia's capital controls allowed it to
recover more quickly from the Asian financial crisis, with a shallower
downturn (Stiglitz, 2003: 125). The capital control measures have generally
taken the form of quantitative restrictions as well as differential reserve
requirements on non-residents' deposits, and unremunerated reserve
requirements on foreign borrowing, etc, as in Chile. Moreover, the various
experiences suggest that controls can be effective in limiting external
liabilities, shifting their composition and providing a degree of monetary
independence in the short-to, possibly, medium-term (Obadan, 2005: 67).

IV.

Experiences of some Individual Emerging Market Economies

Experiences of individual emerging market economies in capital account
liberalization have tended to vary, generally, in the spheres of sequencing of
reforms, exchange rate policy and results of liberalization. A few of the
experiences are reviewed as follows. (See Schneider, 2000: 65-80).

Argentina
The country accepted the IMF's Article VIII obligations in 1968. Article VIII,
Sections 2, 3, and 4, provides for freedom of payments and transfers for current
international transactions. A member country normally accepts Article VIII
only after eliminating all exchange restrictions, as defined by the IMF's
Articles of Agreement. Argentina, however, liberalized both current and
capital account transactions simultaneously in 1991. It adopted a currency
board system of exchange rate management in 1991 that set the exchange rate
of the peso to the US dollar at 1: 1. In the light of the currency board system,
under which the monetary base is determined by international reserves, the
country lacked an independent monetary policy. Results of the capital account
liberalization included:

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -
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Attraction of large inflows of private capital. FDI and portfolio
investment reached 11.0 per cent of GDP in 1993 compared with less
than 1. 0 per cent in 1990.
Improved GDP growth rates and reduced consumer price inflation in the
three years following the convertibility plan.
No financial crisis. But the country suffered from the Latin American
contagion in the wake of the Mexican crisis of 1994-95.
Argentina's experience suggests that while the sequencing of capital account
liberalization is important, strong and credible supporting policies are required
to sustain it.

Chile
Chile accepted Article VIII obligations in July 1977 and initially had a policy
of rapid liberalization. But this ended in a banking crisis in the mid- l 980s. And
so, it gradually pursued CAL in the 1988-1997 period. In the initial phase of the
recent reform effort ( 1985-89), the Chilean authorities focused on
restructuring the banking system, trade reform, the selective liberalization of
direct and portfolio capital inflows, and on creating the institutional
independence of the Central Bank of Chile. In the later phases, the authorities
concentrated upon the development of financial markets, the adoption of more
flexible interest rate and exchange rate policies, and the progressive relaxation
of controls on capital inflows and outflows. Indeed, in order to increase
monetary independence, discourage short-term capital inflows, restrain real
exchange rate appreciation, and limit total capital inflows, the authorities
sought to control capital inflows by requiring foreign investors to place an
unremunerated reserve (URR) at the central bank. The cost of the URR was
inversely proportional to the maturity of the inflow. In 1983, the country
replaced a fixed exchange rate regime with a crawling peg that sought to
maintain a constant level of the real exchange rate against the US dollar. Later,
a crawling band was introduced that enabled the exchange rate to float freely
within a+ 0.5 per cent band (later + 2.0 per cent).
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Over the 1994 - 97 period, Chile attracted a high FDI equiva~ent to ~-0 pe~ cent
of GDP. The macroeconomic environment has been stable wtth low mflatton, a
balanced fiscal position and high rates of economic growth. Studies on the
effectiveness of capital controls on inflows suggest that:
the controls have provided room for an independent monetary policy by
increasing the wedge between domestic and international interest rates;
the controls have lengthened to some extent the maturity structure of
capital inflows;
controls had no effect on the level of total inflows and on the exchange
rate.
Some analysts have, however, argued that the URR has increased the cost of
capital significantly (over 21.0 per cent), especially for small, and mediumsized Chilean firms that found it difficult/impossible to evade the controls on
inflows. Nevertheless, the Chilean experience demonstrates that an
incremental process of capital account liberalisation within a strong
supporting reform framework can be very effective. Chile had a strong
institutional capacity to manage a capital control regime that allows it to be
implemented efficiently and insulated it from conuption. Another lesson is
that controls can be used flexibly to both encourage capital inflows and
diminish their potentially more harmful effects on monetary independence.

Korea
Throughout its period of rapid industrialization from the 1960s to the late
1980s, the Korean economy was characterized by extensive government
intervention. Over the course of the late 1980s, Korea pursued a policy of
gradually liberalizing the domestic financial system and the capital account,
but this was accelerated in 1993 under the administration of Kim Young Sam.
The country accepted Article VIII obligations in 1988, ensuring full
convertibility for current account transactions. Liberalization of the capital
account was gradual and selective and a comprehensive liberalization plan was
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not adopted until 1993. Even then, Korea's policy towards capital account
transactions was guided by developments in the current account. Financial
sector reform, including efforts to improve regulation and supervision, was
pursued concurrently. But this later turned out to be inadequate with the
eruption of the East Asian financial crisis. As part of the reform process, Korea
moved from pegging the won to a basket of currencies to the Market Average
Exchange Rate system in order to allow the exchange rate to be determined
more by market forces.
The capital account liberalization led to increased access of Korean financial
institutions to external financing and a rapid expansion of foreign debt which
nearly trebled from $44.0 billion in 1993 to $120.0 billion in 1997. The
worrisome aspect of this debt was its structure which showed that the share of
short-term debt rose from an already high 4 3. 7 per cent in 1993 to an extremely
high 58 .3 per cent at the end of 1996. Besides, although measures were taken in
the 1990s to liberalize and strengthen the financial sector, persistent
weaknesses of oversight and regulation remained which helped to propel the
country into a crisis in 1997 in the context of the Asian crisis. The rise in the
short-term debt to reserves ratio and concerns about the stability of the
financial sector encouraged continual pressure against the won. When the won
was forced out of its trading bank, its value promptly collapsed, from an
average of 804 won per US$1.0 in 1996 to an average of 1401 won per US$ l .O
in 1998. One major lesson from the Korean experience is the danger of
liberalizing the capital account in the context of inadequate prudential
regulation and an unreformed financial system. The regulatory regime failed to
monitor the activities of the finance companies and this greatly increased the
vulnerability of the country to sudden capital flow reversals. With the absence
of state coordination and poor financial intermediation, funds flowed into low
quality investments in sectors which already had problems with overcapacity.
The Korean experience points to the need to comply with appropriate
conditions for liberalization in terms of financial sector reform, improved
regulation and sequencing. Korea experienced failure in sequencing by
liberalizing short-term flows first as part of crisis management in 1997-98
before liberalizing long-term flows.
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India

.
. . r · s India over the
After decades of inward-looking and mtervent1omst po 1c1e '
'
a ital
course of the 1990s, began a cautious and gradual move towards more c P .
account openness. Capital account convertibility has proceeded gra~~ally m
the context of a broad reform agenda that encompasses trade, competition and
industrial restructuring. Emphasis has been placed on reform of the financial
system as a pre-condition for CAL. India accepted Article VIII in 1994. The
Tarapore Committee on capital account liberalization, in 1997, recommended
a cautious approach that seeks to establish the preconditions for liberalization
on a sound footing. These include fiscal consolidation, an inflation target and,
most importantly, the strengthening of the financial system. As a result, more
stable flows such as direct and portfolio investment were liberalized first,
followed by partial liberalization of debt-creating flows, derivative
transactions and capital outflows. Financial sector reform continued
concurrently. The exchange rate policy has focused on flexible exchange rates
in the context of a managed float.
Despite the liberalisation efforts, India has maintained capital controls.
Controls which have been quantity based rather than market-based have been
oriented towards limiting the country's external debt, particularly reducing
excessive exposure to short-term foreign debt. India's experience shows that
controls have been largely effective in two ways:
limiting measured capital flows and in shifting their composition
towards long-term flows;
preventing, along with other factors, a build-up of short-term external
liabilities that could increase the country's vulnerability to externallygenerated crisis; and
insulating the country from the 1997 Asian crisis.
Although capital controls did not prevent India from experiencing high levels
of external indebtedness and BOP crisis in 1980 and 1991, they effectively
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shifted the composition of capital inflows towards more stable, long-term
flows. Thus, India could receive the benefits of capital account liberalisation
and limit vulnerability.
Malaysia
Malaysia accepted Article VIII obligations in 1968. The capital account had
always been relatively open. From the mid- l 980s, portfolio inflows have been
free of restrictions and banks' foreign borrowing and lending in foreign
exchange have been free (except for net foreign exchange open position
limits). Before the Asian financial crisis, cross-border activities in the national
currency, ringgit, were also free. Financial sector reform has been accelerated
in the wake of the crisis. Before the July 1997 crisis, Malaysia operated a
managed float of the ringgit. But it was pegged to the U. S. dollar with the
imposition of controls in September 1998.
One key result of the relatively liberalized capital account regime was the
attraction of large inflows of foreign capital, comprising both short-and-longterm, in the early 1990s. Capital inflow rose form 5.3 per cent of GDP to 8.3 per
cent in 1993. This was induced mainly by a high interest rate differential and
expectations of a ringgi t appreciation. But then the increased inflows enhanced
concerns regarding sustainability and stability. And the high costs of
sterilization and its maintenance of high interest rates led the authorities to
implement controls on short-term inflows, particularly in the form of
borrowing by banks and ringgit deposits opened by bank and non-bank foreign
customers. In 1997, in the midst of a financial crisis, Malaysia implemented
controls on capital outflows in order to limit downward pressure on the
exchange rate and upward pressure on domestic interest rates that were
exacerbating the contraction, which was already undermining the financial
system. In September 1998, the authorities imposed direct exchange capital
control measures which sought to contain ringgit speculation and the outflow
of capital by eliminating the offshore ringgit market. The controls on capital
inflows were largely successful in achieving their objectives of containing
short-term inflows and the monetary expansion and instilling stability in the
foreign exchange market. Monetary aggregates significantly reduced and the
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capital account surplus fell in response to a reversal in short-term inflows in the
second half of 1994. Long-term flows such as FDI were not affected in the
same way, the controls on outflows imposed in late 1998 were effective in
eliminating the offshore ringgit market.
Even though Malaysia's fundamentals were relatively strong (high growth,
low inflation, full employment, relatively strong financial system and, in
contrast to Thailand and Indonesia, no massive build-up of short-term overseas
debt), the country was also hit by the 1997 Asian crisis. This was due to two
vulnerabilities that had been developing: a massive accumulation of
outstanding domestic credit and a large exposure of the banking system to the
property sector and share trading. Speculators viewed the massive increase in
bank credit as evidence of a decline in the quality of borrowers and reasoned
that an interest rate defence of the ringgit was untenable. The crisis which
ensued revealed weaknesses generated by rapid credit expansion and the
consequent deterioration of bank asset quality. The Malaysian experience thus
suggests the importance of close central bank monitoring of the uses to which
foreign funds are being directed and whether their properties are consistent
with the type of inflows. Besides, improved bank surveillance and
enforcement is required to rapidly ensure provisioning in banks with
escalating non-performing loans.

V. Lessons/ Conclusions
Capital account liberalisation, in recent years, has been undertaken in the
context of increasing pace of globalization. Unlike the developed countries,
the developing countries that have liberalized have done so under less
favourable external conditions, even in the presence of external arrears.
Nevertheless, capital account reforms have been undertaken in view of the
expected benefits of enhanced economic growth, greater efficiency, risk
diversification, intertemporal consumption smoothing, and technology
transfers, among others. But the downside of CAL and the accompanying free
flow of capital was until recently, perhaps, not adequately acknowledged or
appreciated (Obadan, 2005). Thus, while liberalization is generally beneficial,
it also heightens a country's vulnerability to crises; reversals in capital flows
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can precipitate severe currency, banking and balance of payments crises.
Indeed, the record of the last 20 years, particularly, the financial crises that hit
some emerging market economies in EastAsia and Latin America in the 1990s,
with resultant huge economic costs, point to the negative effects of volatile
short-term capital flows and the grave risks and dangers that accompany
careless financial liberalization. In the past, some emerging market economies
liberalized in a big bang way while others adopted a gradualist approach. But
given the relatively poorly developed institutional structures, primarily in the
financial systems, the balance of evidence suggests that countries should adopt
a gradual movement towards capital account liberalization.
Thus, one very important lesson from the past experience is that capital
account liberalization needs to be undertaken in a measured way and orderly
manner, and pragmatically, more especially as it is not an all-or-nothing affair.
Each country has to decide on the degree of CAL based on its own conditions.
Besides, countries need to adequately prepare their economies and ensure that
a number ofboth macroeconomic and non-macroeconomic requirements / preconditions are met. The macroeconomic requirements include the following:
tackling of major fiscal imbalances and achieving macroeconomic
stability first;
a sound monetary policy that complements and is facilitated by fiscal
discipline;
a flexible exchange rate policy;
a higher level of external reserves is needed as a buffer against sudden
financial shocks;
inflation control; and
maintenance ofcurrent account deficits within prudent limits
The other pre-conditions for successful capital account liberalization include
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financial sector reform and strengthening, proper sequencing of CAL,
appropriate policies towards FDI, and better and effective governance in both
public and private sectors. Among these, the central importance of financial
sector reform, prudential norms and effective regulatory supervision cannot be
overemphasized. Effective banking, supervision and regulation, and
observance of prudential norms are crucial for financial sector soundness.
Indeed, some have argued that capital account liberalization, per se, has not
been the cause of financial crises, but rather the failure of supporting policies
prudential regulation and monitoring, weaknesses of the financial sector and
lack of flexibility in exchange rate policies. Thus, it is necessary to develop a
sound financial sector which will enable banks to invest capital inflows
prudently and weather shocks. Very importantly, countries should avoid the
danger of precipitously removing restrictions on capital account transactions
before major problems in the domestic financial system have been addressed.
Besides financial sector strengthening, the proper sequencing of capital
account liberalization is indispensable in order to have orderly and less
destabilizing outcomes. The sequencing should be such that the restructuring
and liberalization of the domestic financial sector precedes the opening up to
foreign investors. The current account should be liberalized before the capital
account is liberalized in a gradual way. Even within the capital account, the
order of liberalization should be inflow before outflow. Also, FDI should be
liberalized first rather than portfolio investment. Finally, the management of
the open capital account may need to be supported with capital controls of a
prudential nature in order to deal with balance of payments pressures and
macroeconomic disturbances generated by volatile capital flows. Both theory
and practical experience point to the legitimacy of using capital controls of a
prudential nature. Capital controls have been found to be effective as the
experiences of some emerging market economies like Chile, Malaysia and
Colombia have shown, particularly in the use of price instruments to alter the
maturity structure of inflows and their impact on monetary and exchange rate
policy. In general, the indirect or market-based instruments of control are
believed to be more effective and have less adverse effects.
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Table 1: Net Capital Account Positions of Some
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil

Argentina

Korea

Peru

India

South

Israel

Singapore Russia

Africa
1989

23-0

n.a

-318.4

-19.6

7,212.5

-26.9

357.3

-40.8

n.a

1990

35.0

n.a

-331.2

-25.0

5,528.1

-56.2

728.0

-21.9

n.a

1991

42.0

n.a

-329.5

-31.0

3,450.3

-35.8

856.6

-33.9

n.a

1992

54.0

15.7

-407.0

-33,0

4,075.3

-421.0

1069.7

-37.9

n.a

1993

81.0

16.1

-475.1

-44.5

7,074.3

-57.0

862.0

--71.4

n.a

1994

173.0

17.5

-436.5

-58.32

10,575.6

-66.6

785.6

-84.1

2,408.0

6o8.8

-72.7

-348.0
-463.0

352.0

14.2

-487.6

31.68

3,860.9

-39.9

1996

494.0

50.8

-597.6

21.6

11,847.8

-47.1

575.6

-138.7

1997

482.0

66.3

-607.6

-49.9

9,634.7

-192.61

552.1

-189.8

-796.0

1998

375.0

72.9

171-1

-57.3

8,583.9

-55.9

397.1

-225.8

-382.0

1999

339.0

149.1

-389.3

-54.3

9,578.6

-61.9

568.7

-191.0

-326.0

2000

272.5

105.9

-615.2

-67.2

11,235-0

-51.9

455.2

-162.8

10,675.0

2001

36.0

156.5

-731.1

-68.2

7,645.3

-31.2

678.9

-161.2

-9,377.9

-95.4

11,054.1

-14.9

150.6

-160.4

-12,395.9

-93.5

n.a

1.6

45.4

-167.6

-995.0

1995

2002

433.0

406.1

-1086.8

2003

298.2

70.1

-1402.1

Source:IMF. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. 2005.
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Table 2: Net Financial Account Positions of Some
Emerging Market Economies.
Poland

Singapore

1989

-11,426

-8,083.0

1,241.0

7,212.5

3,650.0

478.0

36o.7

-464.3

78o.o

-1,796.0

1,250.5

199()

-5Ml

-5,884.0

2,857.0

5,528.1

-4,o61.o

-2.0

-11,039.0

592.9

4,037.0

-8,731.0

3,947-4

1991

-4,868

182.0

963.9

3,450.3

2,204.0

-m-3

-4,706.0

641.4

-2,397-0

-4,183.0

2,345.6

1992

5,889

7,630.3

3,132.0

4,076.3

3,386.0

183.0

-168.0

-450.9

3,648.0

-1,045.0

1,793.1

1993

7,604

20,327.6

2,994.9

7,074.3

2,656.0

2,701.4

-7fi2.o

1040.7

8,963.0

2,341.0

-1,211.9

1994

8,020

11,360.0

5,293.6 10,575.6

-3,204.0

3,392.6

-1,450.0

-958.6

-4,194.0

-9,065.0

-8,840.9

1995

29,306

4,989.3

2,356.6

3,860.9

-2,964.0

4,559.7

-1,845.0

4205-8

4,643.0

9,260.0

-1,071.2

1996

33,426

11,713.1

5,660-4 11,847.8

-1,784

6,683.0

-1,459.0

4536.6

5,483.0

6,673-0

-7,925.5

Brazil Argentina Chile

India

Venezuela Colombia

Egypt

Israel Turkey

1997

24,918

16,745.8

6,742.1

,634.9

879

6,587.5

1,957.8

72o6.8

6,969.0

7.410.0

-11,511.6

1998

20,063
8,056.0

18,935.9
14M8.1

1,966.5
237.5

8,583.9
9,578.6

2,689.0
-516.0

3,3o6.9
-550.9

1,901.0
-1,421-4

-171.7
2874.8

-840.0
4,979.0

13,282.0
10,462.0

-17,784.8
-14,1864

2000 29,376.2

7,852.7

787-7 12,235.0

2,969.0

71.2

-1,646.0

3164.8

8,584.0

10,221.0

-5,750.5

1999

2001

-14,971;0

1,362.2

7,645.3

-21LO

2,484.4

3,173.0

-14,380.6

2002 -3,908.9 -20,582.3

2,097.2

11,054.1

-9,246.0

1,309.0

-3,332.7 -1,526.7

1328.0

7,180.0

-13,558-4

-15,812.3

629.8

n.a

-5,124.0

811.7

-5725.0 -2,526.9

6,959.0

8,734.0

-25,o88.7

2003

Note:

20,331.3
-163.8

189.8

1240.7 -14,644.0

Financial Account comprises inflows (assets) and liabilities on direct investment, portfolio
investment (comprising equity securities and debt securities), financial derivatives, and other
investment assets (relating to monetary authorities, general government, banks and other
sectors).
Source: IMF. International financial statistics, CD-ROM, 2005
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